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 An Aesthetic View of the Relation between Culture 
and Nature 
Mary Douglas  † 
Introduction 
Why is it so difficult to mobilize a strong, world-wide movement to protect the 
environment against global warming? The President of the United Nations has 
recently commented on the lack of leadership for this cause. The general idea is that 
a great leader would inspire world-wide commitment. The first point to be made 
hereconcerns the obvious obstacles that would beset such a leader. If, in this case, 
leadership is impossible, we should give up the quest. Perhaps we could achieve 
commitment without a leader.  
The second point is that a community united by strong solidarity generally 
creates and confers power. It works by spontaneous sanctions on non-conformers, 
who risk being expelled if they continue to defy custom. It endows a leader with 
power when the members want the benefits of coordination. We should remember 
that the combination of power and solidarity can be very dangerous, either by 
violently suppressing its minorities or by waging war on external enemies.  
It remains to ask whether solidarity is possible without endowing authority and 
power? Here I will cite the rare case of a people who have achieved strong solidarity 
without conceding power to anyone. They do it by coercing each other in the name 
of environmental risks. This is what our environmental activists try to do, but for us 
it doesn’t work. On these topics I will present an anthropologist’s view. 
Bias 
One of the reasons for lack of effective enthusiasm for saving the environment is a 
world-wide awareness of bias. World opinion is still deeply divided about human 
responsibility for the present signs of global warning, and it is further divided quite 
passionately as to whether drastic action should be taken at once to reduce emis-
sions of carbon dioxide gases, or whether some by self-correcting process the 
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problem will just go away, or whether it is already too late to make any difference to 
our fate. There are also questions about who should bear the brunt of reform.  
Suspicion of bias gives reasons for rejecting a message. I am far from saying that 
the official communications are biased. Be they ever so clear and consistent, public 
confidence in the validity of what is being communicated is weak. Here I am con-
cerned with bias in the negative sense, when the adjective ›biased‹ de-legitimates an 
opinion. When there is scope for disagreement, bias on each side of an issue weak-
ens support for both. One kind of bias arises from moral convictions; another 
results from a particular ›perspective‹. The moral bias affects the idea of what it is to 
be human, what condition of life is right for human persons to live in, how humans 
should treat one another. This gives rise to political bias, about justice and public 
policy. The other kind of bias is embedded in a particular cultural perspec-
tive.Because of your position you see a blue cup, but if the light changes to yellow, 
you will see a green cup. By itself, the cup looks big, among other really big cups it 
looks small. A shift of perspective does not necessarily involve change of moral or 
political bias. Yet, if we change the kind of company we keep our moral and politi-
cal biases will come under pressure to conform to the new position. Then we are 
very likely to adopt the new cultural perspective Bias is usually blatantly visible to 
others, but invisible to its bearers. Biased persons cannot see any alternative to the 
way they judge the fundamental realities of their lives. The perspective provides 
taken-for-granted categories. Any community strives for a consensus on certain 
facts and principles so as to establish an agreed basis for everyday interaction. Con-
sequently it builds up for its members the cultural bias that is a shared perspective. 
For example, gender, and generation differences usually fall into one of these not-
to-be-questioned categories, also the difference between humankind and animal 
kinds. In a small community anyone who tries to challenge these certainties will be 
cold-shouldered at least, expelled at worst. Cultural theory treats this constructed 
certainty as the ›rationality‹ which upholds a particular kind of social organisation.1 
If conflicting certainties are warning us to withhold consent to what we are being 
told about the environment, we must ask how bias can be controlled. The answer 
will have something to do with self-interest in the short term. 
Anthropologists Must Know Their Own Bias 
Anthropology is a discipline that forces its practitioners to think about bias. The 
most difficult thing we ever have to master is awareness of our own perspective and 
—————— 
 1 For multiple rationalities and ›contradictory certainties‹, see Ellis/Thompson/Wildavsky (1990). 
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our own moral bias. Please excuse my reminiscences. In 1946 I went to Oxford as a 
graduate student of Social Anthropology. It was Evans-Pritchard’s first year as 
Professor. In my first week I eagerly attended a lecture he gave introducing a course 
on ›Fieldwork Methods‹. I was expecting advice for fieldworkers, such as, ›How to 
take notes‹, or ›What boots to wear‹, ›What things should never be done?‹ So I was 
surprised that the lecture was about the history of ideas, and the origins of anthro-
pology. It focused on Robertson-Smith, the great Victorian scholar who had held 
the Free Church Chair of Hebrew at Aberdeen in 1870.  
In Robertson-Smith’s day the big questions about mankind were about the ori-
gins of civilization: Where did it start?Ethnologists and archaeologists had been 
developing methods to show where on the map of the world a particular technique, 
or a particular idea or institution had started, and how it diffused from there. 
Another approach, which was Robertson-Smith’s chosen path, was a fashionably 
Darwinian theory of social and moral evolution. Primitive people used primitive 
tools, and it followed that their religion was primitive, and their moral codes too. It 
would take thousands of years of social evolution for a ›primitive society‹ to catch 
up with the intellectual and moral superiority of the west. Robertson-Smith’s advan-
ced views on evolution caused him to be forced out of his Chair in Aberdeen. 
However, by the time I got to study social anthropology the ›Ethnological‹ 
approach was no longer in fashion. 
After Evans-Pritchard had shot down the whole project of tracing moral and 
intellectual evolution,he concluded with a few words on its contemporary successor, 
›Functionalism‹. Recommending it as the best we could do at present, he took care 
to warn us that Functionalism would one day be shot down in its turn (and so it has 
happened). After the lecture I asked the great man rather petulantly, ›What has all 
this got to do with fieldwork?‹ He answered: ›Wait and see‹.  
Eventually, I found that fieldwork puts the personal baggage of basic assump-
tions and prejudice under constant challenge (Shweder 1991). I came to appreciate 
this first lecture as an indispensable lesson on academic bias. A strong theory only 
allows certain kinds of questions, and favours only specified methods of solving 
them. Each dominant theory blocks out other kinds of questions. We were being 
taught that bias is inevitable. For controlling it the only recourse for the anthro-
pologist is to study bias comparatively, and specially the current theoretical bias, 
explore and exploit it to the full, critically and creatively. Anthropology students 
must above all examine their own bias, make it explicit and visible. This is the first 
step to objectivity. 
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Problems with Objectivity 
I am not personally convinced that we really value objectivity in everyday matters. I 
notice that when I seek to know more about some controversial topic I tend to 
consult authorities whose perspective is the same as my own. Other people seem to 
do the same. Simultaneously, I can feel indignant when important medical advice 
turns out to have been biased by the interests of the pharmaceutical industry. Where 
the natural environment is concerned we do look for objectivity. Some colleagues 
seem to have developed specialized skills for detecting bias in public pronounce-
ments. It is even possible for them to suspect that a geologist’s or an oceanogra-
pher’s argument about global warming might be coloured by his political or reli-
gious convictions. Environmental discourse, however precisely worded by the 
scientists themselves, reeks of bias when it is transferred from a professional state-
ment to the general media. Why is this? 
 The answer is that information about the dangers to the environment (effects 
of carbon dioxide pollution for example) is especially good for pointing the finger 
of blame. There is no disguising the fact that the major offenders are the wealthy 
nations of the western world. Their people own more cars, burn more fuel, travel 
more by air, than the people living in poor countries. In consequence the inter-
national discourse on global climate change is morally and politically loaded from 
the start. Despoiling the environment is becoming one of the regular political accu-
sations even in internal party politics. The moral load becomes a political load, 
which makes it a sensitive subject. Politicians might be wise to avoid it. This sug-
gests another reason why no big leaders are emerging to muster our active support 
for the cause of the environment. We cherish our moral opinions and we don’t like 
being preached at. 
Perspective Bias  
A standardised idea of Nature is a crucial part of any society’s way of functioning. 
How can we discuss Society and Nature when our view of Nature is formed for us 
by our Society? At the same period, as a student of Social Anthropology, I learnt 
something about perspective bias.  
One day a distinguished entomologist was invited to lecture on insect society as 
part of a course on methodology. He talked for a bit, then after setting up a maze 
on the seminar table, he opened a box of ants at one end, putting at the other end 
some incentive for them to find their way out of the maze. We students identified 
with the little creatures as they puzzled their way through various dead-end paths 
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and back again, gradually learning by their mistakes, eventually mastering the pattern 
and arriving triumphantly at the exit, and reward. Some ants were quicker than 
others, a few got stuck, going round and round pathetically, making the same mis-
takes over and over again. The maze was only too like the University as we experi-
enced it. 
Eventually it was time to bring the exercise to an end. The demonstrator got 
ready to go. First he gathered up the successful ants and returned them to their box. 
Then he began to fold up his maze., but the failed ants were still wandering discon-
solately around the table. He was in a hurry. We held our breath in suspense, won-
dering what he would do about them. It would obviously be too difficult to pick 
them up one by one, and improper to release them into the seminar room by shak-
ing out the cloth. 
No problem! He simply squashed the deviants with his thumb, saying dismissi-
vely, ›It doesn’t matter. They are the stupid ones‹. 
We were shocked. Formerly, we would have shared the taken-for-granted per-
spective that insects are a nuisance, just pests. In that perspective human needs have 
strict priority. But now we had made a change of perspective. We had personally 
identified with the insects. We were dismayed to discover that there is a difference 
between ›Us‹, (the human subjects of study), and ›Them‹ (the non-human subjects). 
If a tiger escapes or a poisonous snake, it will be killed without compunction, like-
wise insects. Ants on the loose get no respect.  
This lesson bodes ill for hopes of possible harmony between society and nature. 
Admittedly, not all sectors of our society assume the priority of human values over 
animals. In England we are drawn into disputes about animal rights. Anger against 
blood sports has increased. Fish are now being counted as animals and fishing as a 
blood sport.. In August this year a gang of 35 masked animal-rights activists were 
harrying a grouse shooting party in Lancashire. Turned away by the police, the 
frustrated attackers came upon a party of anglers. They assaulted them with stones 
and sticks, threatened to throw them into the river, and started to break their rods. 
(Daily Telegraph, 19/8/2006). The police in the Midlands are warning fishers that 
they are in increasing danger.  
Let the case illustrate the two main kinds of bias. Members of a group which 
maintains the rights of humans to make sport with animal lives have probably been 
hunting and fishing for generations without ever considering the fish’s point of 
view. They would be acting on their taken-for-granted perspective. On the other 
side, People who fight for the right of animals to be safe from sportsmen are surely 
fired by moral principles.  
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Back to Objectivity 
If a person were to go through life without any moral convictions the life would be 
of no account, hardly human. Bias is not wrong, it is normal and right. Yet we need 
to control it because physical scientists have identified the perils that menace our 
environment. They have targeted our society of advanced industrial capitalism as 
responsible for the danger facing our planet. I am not wishing in any way to contra-
dict this. We still have good reasons for wanting to be objective about the environ-
ment.  
Scientific methods of gaining objectivity are hard to apply to moral and cultural 
questions. Physics and Chemistry use controlled experiment but moral principles 
forbid us to experiment on human beings. Biologists achieve objectivity by detailed 
measurement on planned comparisons. But there again, grave difficulty attends the 
measuring, even the classifying, of human values. For comparing values objectivity 
is notoriously elusive. We should consider whether the quest for objectivity about 
the environment is just as unrealistic as the wish for a world leader or for world-
wide solidarity.  
A philosopher friend, S. Guttenplan, reminds me that a universalistic viewpoint 
could claim to be objective in the usual sense of the word. That would be a view 
that has no sectoral interests; it only seeks to know what is good or bad for all man-
kind, or the planet. It is a very lofty position. We could try to take it if we are not 
put off by Thomas Nagel’s idea that a view unaffected by any particular stand point 
would be a ›View from Nowhere‹ (Nagel 1989), which doesn’t sound very helpful. 
Let us leave this issue on one side, it only arises because physical science offers 
prestigious models of objective reasoning and provides the grand theoretical back-
ground of our thinking.  
Characteristically, science proceeds by dividing, defining, and polarising. 
Following faithfully in its footsteps we find ourselves pitting Society against Nature, 
two separate concepts on which we start to work in the scientific style of dividing 
and defining. This leads us to polarize the two formidable agencies, Society and 
Nature, a process which is bound to expose dormant layers of bias: we take sides; 
we identify enemies, we preach sermons against them – and that is about all we can 
do. 
Perspective on Nature 
In a very profound sense we are truly biased about Nature, and we can’t help it. We 
never see Nature except through a socially fabricated lens. Society makes the bias by 
 D O U G L A S :  A E S T H E T I C  V I E W  115  
 
agreeing on certain fixed perspectives. One of the real problems in thinking on this 
subject, even in using the word ›nature‹, is that we have long indulged a habit of 
using ›the natural‹ as a synonym for ›the good‹. Thus the idea of ›nature‹ is made 
into a weapon to enforce conformity. In this usage conformity to a cultural ideal is 
approved as ›natural behaviour‹, while deviance is judged to be ›contrary to nature‹, 
or ›unnatural‹, and therefore disapproved.  
There is still a tendency to use the idea of natural and unnatural to indicate 
moral status. Incest bears the stigma of being contrary to nature. The history of 
gender provides many examples. We are familiar with persecution of homosexuality. 
Transsexuals pose problems for the legal process when the rights of men and 
women are legally defined. A boy registered at birth in 1935 as George Jamieson, 
grew up with striking girlish prettiness. He was so much bullied for his feminine 
looks that he miserably thought he was a girl in a boy’s body. In 1960 he underwent 
the operation that equipped him with a woman’s body. He became a truly glamo-
rous female, re-naming herself April Ashley. In 1970 she married, but later in Court 
her marriage was declared null because the judge ruled that she never could have 
been legally married. He judged that she had always been a man; no amount of 
surgeon’s skill could alter that natural fact. (In the course of time the bias against 
transsexuals has softened, and the law has been changed.) Her life-story is a recent 
example of the bias against sexual deviance justified in the name of Nature.  
 When the idea of Nature is constructed as a model for good human appearance 
and good human behaviour, the word is being used as a policing strategy. The 
forensic myth is transparently false. Did any one really think that animals in the 
natural state would not ›commit‹ incest? Or ›sodomy‹? The University of Oslo has 
just opened an exhibition of gay animals. »Homosexuality has been recorded in 
some 1.500 species so far, and been well-documented in about a third of these 
cases. It has been known since the time of Aristotle, who thought he witnessed two 
male hyenas having sex with one another«. Has the diversity of Nature been hidden 
all this while by an age-long conspiracy of decency?  
Sermonising and Casting Blame 
The fact that the word ›nature‹ carries a moral freight makes it especially susceptible 
to bias. Wise politicians have learnt to be wary of moralizing. In modern industrial 
society we are hardened to rebuke. Indeed, scolding achieves very little. When 
Tawney’s Acquisitive Society exposed our generally selfish and unchristian chasing 
after goods of all kinds, I doubt whether he got the readers to change their ways. 
Never a year now passes without new books or articles upbraiding the ›consumer 
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society‹, and new appeals to reform. We are tired of it; we have heard it so often. 
The reproaches run off, like water off a duck’s back. The moral high ground is a 
shaky place for a would-be leader to be, if he is going to take the planet out of dan-
ger. A problem for him: if he bores us by sermonizing, how is he going to attract 
our attention?  
Time Scale 
Appeals to individual self-interest would be much more effective than sermons. If 
we could be led to believe that even small increases in carbon-dioxide emissions will 
shorten our own personal life expectancy, or make house values fall, or prevent our 
children from passing exams, we might take a more active interest. But self-interest 
will not be engaged unless the time-scale is short, say five or six years. We tend to 
get our idea of the middle-term and the long-term from the structure of the society 
we live in. Members of stable societies are better able to think in the long term2. 
Technologically advanced nations are continually under-going rapid change and 
fragmentation from the effects of tele-communications. Consequently moderns are 
only aware of a short time span.  
At a WBSI workshop in La Jolla in the 1980’s the climatologist, Walter Orr 
Roberts, offered to explain to a group of American industrialists the predicted cli-
mate changes likely to affect their firms over the next 20 years3. Surely they would 
be interested in the emergence of a flood plain on their door-step? Or worried 
about the impending desertification of a nearby agricultural zone? To everyone’s 
surprise, they were not interested. Politely they apologised, saying that the time-span 
of twenty years was too long. None of them could imagine what he would be doing 
in 20 years’ time, or where he would be living. So a long and uncertain time-scale 
gives one more reason for the slow mobilisation of opinion in an urgent cause. 
There is no need to look in the far future. Even at this very moment bad things are 
happening to ocean fish and to birds. If we could be told that we will personally 
suffer from climate change in the next five years self-interest might spur commit-
ment.  
—————— 
 2 I have discussed this in The World of Goods. 
 3 Western Behavioral Science Institute, La Jolla, directed by Richard Farson. 
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Other Scale Problems 
Appeals for help to prevent some dire fate for the world population tend to fall on 
deaf ears. You might say that the scale of the ›social unit‹ at risk is too big, or you 
might say the trouble is that there is no inclusive social unit. The problem of raising 
contributions for a collective good from members of a very large group is well-
known (Olsen 1965). What we, the general public, are asked to do in order to 
reduce pollution is trivial compared with the alleged scale of the threat − it can’t be 
serious. Each of us is asked to use less power in the home, to turn out the lights, re-
cycle waste, use public transport, avoid air travel, and so on. As there will be no 
benefit unless millions of people do it, rational self-interest would take a free-ride 
on the contribution of the others – »My contribution won’t make any difference«.  
 I have named four reasons why the danger to the environment poses questions 
awkward enough to put off any would-be-global leaders. Suspicion of bias confuses 
alignments, moralizing is counter-productive, the wrong time-scale diminishes pub-
lic commitment, and so does wrong group-size. Given these negative factors, great 
leadership is an unattainable dream for the present environmental problems. Let us 
not grieve for what we cannot have.  
 Can world-wide solidarity be achieved without a world leader? Perhaps before 
that we should ask whether lack of solidarity really imperils a global pro-environ-
ment movement. At first it seems obvious that it does. Political scientists and philo-
sophers often deplore the loss of communitarian values. Russell Hardin’s book, One 
for All (Hardin 1995), is an antidote to romantic yearnings for solidarity. He empha-
sizes the dark side of living in a community. Once formed, a group exerts great 
power over the members, and demands conformity on pain of exclusion. Some 
unintended side-effects of group formation include violence against deviants, and 
sometimes brutal extermination of minorities. The solidary group is likely to pro-
voke conflict with neighbouring groups. He illustrates the argument with the recent 
history of Yugoslavia and the civil wars of Serbia and Croatia. The costs of war in 
terms of destruction, pain and sorrow, are appalling. For our topic, the outbreak of 
war is the worst kind of disaster for the climate. 
Hardin’s warning is enough to stop anyone thinking that solidarity on a world 
scale will promote care for the environment. To imagine a ›solidarity‹ that unites 
different nations and divergent creeds is an even more starry-eyed dream than 
hoping for a world leader. It is the concentration of power and solidarity that is 
dangerous.  
Surely it is possible to imagine a form of solidarity that does not concentrate 
power in the hands of a leader? Or would that be another romantic dream? What 
about a solidarity that emerges from the combined interests of individuals who want 
to achieve some coordination? Hardin supposes that this is bound to create power 
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and unified control. I will offer a counter example from African research which 
shows how following self-interest can create solidarity without endowing any mem-
ber of a group with power. To prepare the ground for this, we need to go back to 
basic questions of methodology. 
Repleteness as a Method 
It is not the fault of modern science that we pick up the age-old polarising habit. At 
different times we have thought of Nature, ›red in tooth and claw‹, as the aggressor 
against society, but at present it is the other way round. Society is seen as the 
aggressor against Nature, the victim. I would like to find a method of thinking 
about these problems that does not pit one term against the other, but treats Nature 
and Society as parts of one unit. Such a method might take a lot of political sensiti-
vity and moral heat out of the problem.  
 Writing in aesthetic philosophy, the late Nelson Goodman applied the idea of 
rightness or fittingness to the internal relation between the features of the art object. 
A poem or painting has rightness, or is ›replete‹, when all the elements fit and con-
tribute to the whole. Do the different elements of a painting support each other? Or 
do they jostle, jar, or intrude? We ask the same of literature, do the elements of this 
story fit together? We recognize what he has named ›repleteness‹ when we see it, in 
a face, in a building, a picture or sculpture. Repleteness is a purely formal aspect of a 
work of art. It implies nothing about its content. When everything is linked together 
in a mutually enhancing way, the dense coherence of the work of art inspires 
respect, even awe. Goodman taught that this is how we recognize something as a 
work of art. The idea that I propose to adapt to thinking about humankind in its 
environment is to study them as interacting elements of one thing. We may be able 
to ask new questions about our topic. 
But look out! We must not conclude that it is an inherent part of our nature to 
love coherence, symmetry and exhaustively ordered connectedness. Alas, no! The 
evidence does not support any such claim. We love other qualities as well. Remem-
ber our history and take account of bouts of enthusiasm for the excitement of 
revolt. Read about the exhilaration of revolution and the stimulus of periods of 
confusion.  
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Society and Nature 
To return to our topic in hand − we had got to a point at which objectivity seemed 
unobtainable. We looked for another kind of approach to lay the spectre of hidden 
bias that besets all the arguments we know. Never mind about the view from now-
here. Our own familiar culture is the only honest stand-point we can use. Combin-
ing it with Goodman’s theory of the ›replete‹ we can try to have a different conver-
sation about what is going on.  
 In the context of our topic, ›Replete‹ suggests a people and their environment 
co-existing in harmony. This suggests the discourse of the ecologists who examine 
particular ecological zones. They observe the competition for survival between the 
different plant species; over time they note the success of some in dominating the 
others in a particular ecological zone; the climax arrives when the hegemony of 
some species and the minor status of the other species reach equilibrium. Some-
times (not always) each element seems to be contributing to the well-being of the 
others. The scientist’s work is to assess the balance of mutual dependence.  
 So far from endorsing our romantic philosophers’ ideal, we are looking at a 
well-tried method of identifying and comparing biological systems. We are not 
going to compare values or emotions, we will only study relations, interactions and 
exchanges. It is surely a merit that we have come back to the practice of scientists. 
We find we can reach some degree of objectivity because we have eschewed the 
comparison of values. All we have to do is trace the internal relations of the parts. 
Biologists do it all the time, and other scientists too. An entirely pragmatic exercise 
of measuring and counting may avoid the pitfalls of objectivity that entrap the 
humanists. The skill will lie in choosing parts whose relations can fit or not fit to-
gether. 
Before proceeding I need to note a difficulty. It is easy to think of examples of 
wrong relations between nature and society. Our context is that our relation to 
nature is wrong. We know that we are destroying our own climate, and that nature 
will respond by destroying our society. But climate is an ambiguous example for this 
exercise. How can a human society enhance its own climate? The present context is 
a case of wreaking destruction and then deciding to do something to stop the dam-
age. This would count as an attempt to restore rightness in the relationship that has 
gone wrong. It is an exceptional case, and in the examples that follow I will not 
suppose that a people can do anything to enhance their climate. 
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Pygmies in the Equatorial Forest 
Repletion is about mutual enhancement of different elements. As an Africanist I try 
to suggest some African societies engaged in the mutual enhancement of their envi-
ronment and society. It is instructive to start with mentioning the pygmies living in 
the equatorial forests of the Congo region. As far as I can see, their case does not fit 
the problem.  
 They live entirely by hunting wild game and gathering plants. The several char-
ming ethnographies of pygmy life never suggest that there is any danger of their 
killing off the game animals or using up the vegetable life, spoiling the water, or 
damaging the trees by building shelters. They are too few in number, their level of 
technology is too simple. The forest provides everything for their way of life. They 
do it no harm. But, as far as I can see, they do nothing to enhance the life of the 
forest around them. This would be the case for many peoples living in extreme 
environments. They don’t qualify for this exercise because the scale of their interac-
tions is too small for them either to enhance or harm the forest on which they 
depend utterly.  
The Lele people, whom I studied half a century ago (Douglas 1952), might 
count as having achieved environmental repletion, though it was precarious. They 
lived in little villages in the Kasai region of the (then) Belgian Congo, at an overall 
density of about 4 to the square mile. Take note that authority was very weak, prac-
tically absent, in Lele social life. An elder brother had some authority over his 
younger brother, a mother’s brother over his nephew but, apart from close kinship, 
no one had any power to command. The village (averaging 200 people) was the 
significant social unit.  
The village appointed a nominal chief or head man, but they defined his office 
so that no power whatever resided in it. He had to perform some rituals, and his 
only qualification for the office was to have outlived his peers, he had to be the 
oldest old man in the village. He was ex officio too old and too doddery to give 
orders of any kind. Though the villages were so small, it was extremely difficult for 
them to raise support for any communal task. Groups of such villages recognized 
common origins in the name of which they could request armed help if under 
attack. Such units had no headman or chief. How did they manage to live together 
with considerable solidarity and without leadership or power?  
As Russell Hardin would have us expect, anyone who offended the community 
was threatened with expulsion. What organisation they achieved was thanks to 
skilful balancing of interests. Both men and women worked in the fields to plant 
maize and manioc, bananas, palms and peppers in forest clearings. They used shif-
ting cultivation with slash-and-burn techniques. In the savannah bush around the 
villages they grew pineapples, beans and groundnuts. In addition, the women fished 
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and reared poultry; the men drew palm-wine, wove cloth with raffia threads, sewed 
raffia garments, and hunted wild game.  
Slash-and-burn is notoriously bad for the land if it is practiced over a large area. 
The branches of trees are burnt to provide space for planting and wood ash for 
fertilizer. The damage in the Lele case was limited by the wet climate which allowed 
the cut trees to regenerate quickly. Lele fields were very small. It was very hard work 
to climb up and lop off big branches. The iron they themselves dug and smelted 
was soft, their axes were small and blunt. Chopping off the branches with these 
axes was painfully laborious and of course they never could have cut down the 
trunks. I count their inefficient tools as an unintended handicap for the farmers and 
an advantage for the trees. The branches were left to dry out on the ground before 
the firing. After the harvest the fields were left fallow for a few years for new 
branches to grow before they were cut and fired again.  
Partly by accident, partly by intention, the process was less destructive than it 
might have been. I can say this by imagining another people than the Lele settling 
here and causing more damage. The Lele farmers hated the work of cutting and 
clearing, they put it off as long as possible. It had to be complete before the onset 
of the rainy season, or nothing would burn at all. It follows that the heavy work had 
to be done in the short period of unrelieved heat and dryness. Choosing the date of 
firing depended on consensus, first on the probable time of the wet season, and 
second on negotiating village-wide agreement.  
Firing too soon near the end of the dry season was dangerous lest the blaze 
went out of control and set the whole forest on fire. Firing too late meant that rains 
had started and the vegetation would be too wet to burn at all. The annual gamble 
with the climate demanded solidarity. 
Once the outside fields had been cleared the empty space made a kind of fire-
break. They knew that smoke going up could seed the clouds and release the pent-
up rain. If the rain came before the fields were ready, there would be a very poor 
harvest. To prevent such a disaster they made a rule against any farmer firing his 
fields before everyone in the village was ready. Any one who broke the rule would 
be penalised. This was to prevent fire spreading from one prepared field to the 
unprepared fields and right through the forest. The farmer who got badly behind 
schedule took another risk: his fellow villagers, fearing that the dry season would be 
over before he was ready, might decide to disregard him and go ahead with the 
firing. His plot would be burnt before he had cleared it, and the rising smoke would 
make the rain fall, which would ruin his farming year, though everyone else would 
be well served.  
Synchronizing the rain and the fire and managing the forest would be impos-
sible without being able to manage the village. They would never have been able to 
do the farming if they had not invested a lot of energy in producing solidarity. I 
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offer this as an example of repletion. The society depended on the forest, they took 
a lot out of it, but they took trouble to protect it. This they were only able to do 
because reciprocally the forest not only provided meat and raw materials, it pro-
vided the society with the incentive to collaborate.  
The Communal Hunt 
The harmony of their community was always present as an ideal. Lele religion 
focused on peace within the village. For example, they claimed that spirits living in 
the forest would be angered by quarrelling in the village, and would hide away the 
animals, or deflect the arrows. Failure of the communal hunt was directly caused by 
fighting the day before.  
At dawn, when it was still barely light, 12 to 30 hunters would assemble in the 
centre of the village. They talked and agreed on a likely area for finding game. Be-
fore they set off, they performed a little peace-making rite: each man took his knife 
out of his belt and exchanged it with that of another member of the hunt. Though 
the headman of the village was too old to hunt, he had to come and give his bless-
ing. If there was a man or a woman who had displayed anger in the few days pre-
ceding, this was the time to come out and publicly bless the hunt. If an offended 
person neglected to declare forgiveness all round, he or she could be blamed after-
wards for failures in the hunt. When the ceremonial precautions had been taken, the 
majority of the hunters would go to surround the chosen place and wait at their 
posts while a few would take the dogs in and drive the herds of wild pig or ante-
lopes on to the hunters’ arrows.  
The communal hunt was not always effective in providing meat. Only too often 
the tired huntsmen came home empty-handed, or with only one small antelope for 
a whole day’s work, nowhere near enough to share between 100 or 200 people. The 
Lele did not use poisoned arrows like their neighbours, the Nkutu, or nets, like the 
Mbuti. They had no money to buy guns like the Chokwe. Hunting with nets could 
be effective with only a few men. Poisoned arrows were good for the solitary 
hunter. The Lele knew about these methods, but I surmise that the more effective 
techniques were incompatible with their most cherished institution. The communal 
hunt, with dogs and bows and arrows, involved collaboration of all the active men, 
young and old.  
A successful hunt they celebrated in the evening with dancing. After an unsuc-
cessful hunt informal de-briefings brought into the open the quarrels deemed to 
have caused its failure. Its very chanciness enhanced their solidarity. The mere 
prospect of the hunt called forth reconciliations and expressions of mutual good 
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will. This may serve as another Lele example of repleteness. The life of the forest 
animals was enhanced by the accepted inefficiency of the hunt. The village benefi-
ted by enhanced solidarity which enabled them to synchronise the firing of their 
fields.  
Remark that this effort to trace ›repleteness‹ between society and nature has 
treated them as one. Indeed, the enquiry assumes that they are parts of a composite 
thing. The Lele village would not be intelligible without taking the forest into 
account. It would not even be able to function. If a different people were living 
there, with different hunting techniques, the forest might be hunted out, or burnt 
out. With less solidarity the human society would not have succeeded in co-ordina-
ting the agricultural work, the forest could be burnt down or the people might have 
starved. Here Society and Nature are bound up inextricably, they are really one. And 
we have an example of solidarity that does not give rise to centralised power. 
I hope (and expect) to be criticised by Central Africanists for several aspects of 
this analysis. Hunting and cultivation were the most conspicuous interactions with 
Nature. If I had picked on other processes, I might have got different results. Many 
other aspects of their lives could be assessed in this way, item by item. Some would 
come out positively, clearly marked up for repleteness. For example, the Lele 
planted palm trees in the forest and tended them. They also observed punctiliously 
their instituted day of rest, every third day. The short two-day working week ought 
to be counted as a relief for the forest. Some other aspects would be negative: for 
example, abuse of animals, neglect of their poultry. Failure to collaborate with other 
villages, or their mistrust of outsiders, or the lack of authority vested in the Nyimi, 
their Chief, might be subjected to this treatment, and count negatively against 
repletion. To do the job properly would need more historical background, and 
comparative material from neighbouring peoples. For example, the Bushong, with a 
much more organized social system, managed a more prosperous agriculture. 
Conclusion 
It will strike you that the cases I have mentioned, Pygmy and Lele, are too rural and 
too exotic to compare with modern industrial society. It will be a pity if, after all this 
trouble to find a mode of enquiry that escapes the pitfalls of objectivity, it can only 
be applied to very small communities. However, that conclusion would be false 
because we have seen that scale factors cannot be ignored in the discussion of soli-
darity.  
In other branches of the Social Sciences we do analyse smaller, more definable 
units. Something very similar is practiced in Business Schools. To draw the parallels 
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some simple substitutions are in order. For the Lele village, substitute a modern 
company; for the Lele attempts to control members of the village, substitute the 
Management; for the Lele forest, by turns compliant and mysteriously wayward, 
substitute the Work-force; for the Lele concern for solidarity, substitute the Man-
agement’s concern for ›commitment‹. The Management quantifies its success rate 
by output and sales, the Lele village quantifies its success rate by the amount of 
meat brought in. The count for repleteness would work as well for either case. 
Likewise it would be possible to select a small section of a modern city for a parallel 
study of human relations with the local environment.  
For our dealings with our climate, we might be able to adapt the way they use 
individual self-interest to get conformity in the timing of the fires. I don’t see how 
we could copy the extent to which Lele solidarity depends on the theory that forest 
spirits monitor their behaviour and apply sanctions through the communal hunt. It 
would be like asking our scientists to discover a force that punishes our infractions 
of the climate protection rules by reducing the success of our national football 
teams. 
At least ›replete‹ offers a way of studying our own interactions with others. It 
can evade local bias. It does not force us into allegiance with one or other of the 
major ideological conflicts of our own day. The more easily the interaction is con-
ceived in terms of parts of a single unit, the more do the interesting questions 
emerge, and the stronger the hope of avoiding the pitfalls of objectivity. 
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